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Abstract 
Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, 
whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for 
consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, 
specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, 
and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature 
between those systems that are conscious, as described by these properties, and those that 
are not. This approach throws new light on phenomenology, and suggests that some self-
evidencing may be characteristic of consciousness. 
 




1. Self-evidencing is not sufficient for consciousness 
A core notion of predictive processing is that existing, self-organising systems are self-
evidencing (Hohwy 2016). Their internal states and their actions upon the environment are 
in the service of maximising the evidence for their own existence, for themselves. 
Equivalently, self-evidencing systems reduce uncertainty about their sensory input, given 
their model of the states they expect to occupy. This model defines what kind of system 
they are – in some sense who they are.  
 
Self-evidencing per se is not an evolved function of some creatures. Rather, self-evidencing 
falls out of consideration of what it means for a self-organising system to exist. Specifically, 
it relates to a statistical understanding of existence of such (near equilibrium steady state) 
system in terms of the probability of occupying some and not other states. The free energy 
principle (Friston 2010, Friston 2019) argues that in a changeable world, active systems exist 
in virtue of managing to occupy their expected states; equivalently, they organise 
themselves and act in their environments to avoid surprising states, given their model 
(there is debate about the scope of the free energy principle; here I focus on self-organising, 
active systems). The free energy principle rests on a compelling argument that in order to 
do so, such systems focus on a quantity that is available for internal assessment, namely the 
free energy, which is a measure of the surprise of their sensory input given their model 
(often usefully simplified in the predictive processing framework as the long-term average 
of prediction error) (it is thus a transcendental argument that underlies the free energy 
principle, concerning the necessary conditions for the possibility of existence of self-
organising systems, see (Hohwy 2020)). If the system is able to minimise free energy, then 
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they will implicitly minimise the surprise about their input, given what kind of model of the 
world they embody; minimising free energy is then equivalent to maximising evidence for 
the system’s model of the world – self-evidencing. The appeal to free energy is critical 
because systems cannot directly assess the surprise of a given sensory input; this is because 
doing so directly would impossibly require the system knowing a priori which states it is 
supposed to occupy among all the indefinite number of possible states they could occupy. 
 
The idea is then that self-organising systems essentially self-evidence when they, in a broad 
sense, perceive, change their internal states, and act upon the world. The reasoning from 
existence to free energy minimisation is conceptual (what is existence of self-organising 
systems?) and mathematical (proving that free energy bounds surprise, and thus model 
evidence). It is an austere vision of existence, which systems may or may not conform to, 
and self-evidencing does not convey a law of nature in the sense of quantifying over some 
domain (for discussion, see Hohwy 2020). 
 
Assume that some self-organising systems in the world are conscious and some are not 
conscious. If indeed all self-organising systems are self-evidencing in the basic way 
described, then self-evidencing describes both conscious and non-conscious systems. Self-
evidencing is then necessary for consciousness in self-organising systems in some fairly 
unspecific sense, but the fact that a given system is self-evidencing (and predictive 
processing) is in itself not sufficient for ensuring that the system is conscious. This presents 
a challenge for attempts to build a theory of consciousness directly on self-evidencing and 
the free energy principle. It is necessary to find a distinction within self-evidencing that can 
provide a demarcation between conscious and non-conscious systems. There are now 
several intriguing approaches to consider consciousness in terms of predictive processing 
and kindred ideas (Carhart-Harris, Leech et al. 2014, Rudrauf, Bennequin et al. 2017, Friston 
2018, Williford, Bennequin et al. 2018, Clark 2019, Chang, Biehl et al. 2020, Friston, Wiese et 
al. 2020). Conversely, there are proposals for how to re-cast existing theories in terms of 
predictive processing such as heterophenomenology (Dołęga and Dewhurst 2020), global 
neuronal workspace theory (Hohwy 2013, Whyte 2019, Whyte and Smith 2020), versions of 
higher-order thought theory and metacognitive theories (Hohwy 2015, Sandved Smith, Hesp 
et al. 2020), attention-based theories (Marchi and Hohwy 2020), and integrated information 
theory (see Kanai, Chang et al. 2019). The assumption that some predictive processing 
systems can be non-conscious, and questions about demarcation, are rarely addressed 
head-on. 
 
There is a different strategy available, which contrasts with building a new theory of 
consciousness. This strategy considers predictive processing broadly conceived the 
explanatory framework for consciousness science. It can be used to interpret the neural 
mechanisms revealed in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness, thereby 
throwing new light on different aspects of consciousness and properties of conscious 
phenomenology (Hohwy 2013: Ch 10, Hohwy and Seth 2020). There are some recent 
proposals that also move in this direction (Ramstead, Wiese et al. 2020, Wiese 2020, Wiese 
and Friston 2020, Ramstead, Hesp et al. 2021). 
 
On this approach, the fact that self-evidencing in itself is insufficient for consciousness does 
not imply that self-evidencing is irrelevant for consciousness. Though the basic notion of 
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self-evidencing is austere, there are several distinct ways that different types of systems can 
minimise their free energy, or act to occupy unsurprising states. Some of these ways may be 
explanatorily relevant for consciousness, whereas others are not, allowing a demarcation in 
nature. That is, some specific processes for self-evidencing may be explanatorily relevant for 
specific properties of consciousness, while respecting the assumption that some systems 
are not conscious. 
 
This strategy puts a list of phenomenological properties of consciousness first, focusing on 
properties worth caring about and worth explaining. The initial list may be incomplete, 
failing to capture all and only conscious systems. Eventually, the project of matching 
properties of consciousness to self-evidencing processes could be made complete, and then 
one could erect a theory of consciousness from self-evidencing. That more ambitious 
project is not undertaken here. Instead, after situating the project within consciousness 
science (Section 2), an initial list of properties of consciousness is identified, which it would 
be worth explaining (Section 3). Then diverse ways of self-evidencing are described, and 
matched up with the listed properties of consciousness (Section 4). Finally, consideration of 
what can be accomplished by this strategy (Section 5).  
 
The outcome is not a comprehensive theory of consciousness. But it paints an interesting 
picture of core properties of consciousness: consciousness is formed through the way we 
internally model the external world, it unfolds in causal interaction with the world, but it is 
forged in deeply detached, internal processes driven by self-evidencing. 
 
2. Self-evidencing in the science and metaphysics of consciousness 
In consciousness science, the notion of consciousness is used in different ways, referring 
variously to awareness, awakeness, or sentience, or to either conscious state or conscious 
contents, or to what philosophers call phenomenal or qualitative states, or qualia, or to 
being conscious or what one is conscious of, or, to self-consciousness, self-awareness, or 
just the self. The varied use of the notion of consciousness is not immediately damaging to 
the scientific prospects of consciousness science. One of the often overlooked successes of 
consciousness science is the work done to parse out different senses of the term, making it 
easier to speak more precisely, and to stratify and operationalise research accordingly. 
 
However, there remains a slippery, difficult-to-define notion of consciousness underlying 
most of the various uses of the term. Our inability to unequivocally define in functional or 
structural terms what this notion is lies at the heart of the philosophical debate about the 
metaphysics of consciousness. This includes arguments that the nature of consciousness 
must necessarily escape all scientific explanation, at least for sciences that operate in terms 
of the function and structure of natural processes. This is the difficult, ‘hard’ metaphysical 
problem of consciousness – the mind-body problem (Nagel 1974, Chalmers 1996, Levine 
2001).  
 
No-one, it is safe to say, has as yet solved the mind-problem problem, and it will not be 
attempted here. There are, rather, various ways to address or circumvent the metaphysical 
problem. One is to focus on what has been called the ‘easy’ problems of consciousness 
(metaphysically easy, yet still scientifically hard, see Chalmers 1995, Chalmers 1995): 
processes for integration of information, sensory discrimination, reportability, differences 
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between global states of consciousness and so on. These processes are not exclusive to 
consciousness but scaffold it in various ways. They are easier to explain because they can be 
given functional and structural definitions and explained in neuroscience or computational 
terms. 
 
In spite of the murky centre of the notion of consciousness, there are also 
phenomenological properties that we take to be characteristic of conscious systems, and 
not of non-conscious systems. And these properties can be given functional or structural 
definitions that poise them sufficiently to be explanatory targets for naturalistic science. 
Here, this phenomenological approach is taken, with Section 3 setting out the list of 
properties. This is close to an ‘easy’ problem approach, and borrows some of its scaffolding 
processes, but the phenomenological starting point pulls the resulting explanations closer to 
consciousness. 
 
Perhaps once enough of these properties of consciousness are explained scientifically, 
interest in the supposedly remaining base of consciousness, and the mind-body problem, 
will fade away (Seth forthcoming). In this perspective, the “real” problem of consciousness 
is to match up phenomenology with underlying neural mechanisms. Here, we will be 
agnostic about the fate of the hard problem – it might persist even after all interesting 
properties of consciousness are explained. 
 
An alternative way to approach the problem of consciousness is to broaden the presence of 
consciousness to a much wider class of things than humans, or certain animals, or things 
with brains. This might be a metaphysical view, panpsychism, which sees this as the only 
escape from the hard problem (Nagel 1979). Or is might be a theory-driven, naturalistic 
view, such as the view that since consciousness is integrated information, and integrated 
information is ubiquitous, consciousness is ubiquitous (Tononi and Koch 2015; call this 
‘infopsychism’). Self-evidencing could go that route, too, and claim that every self-
organising system that self-evidences is consciousness (call this ‘biopsychism’). 
 
There is much interesting reasoning behind panpsychism,  infopsychism and biopsychism, 
but they are unworkable. There is wide agreement that many of the things that are 
supposed to possess these basic and ubiquitous “proto”-consciousness properties are not 
conscious in anything like the sense we humans are conscious. But it is exceedingly hard to 
scale up from these kinds of basic consciousness-properties to our familiar kind of 
consciousness. Attempts to scale up seem to import some critical functional or structural 
elements (e.g., of brain processes) along the way, which in fact ends up doing all the 
explaining. Varieties of “pan”-consciousness are therefore most likely explanatorily otiose. 
 
A further approach to the hard problem of consciousness is to argue that it is only an 
apparent problem. There are several routes here, including takes on predictive processing 
(Clark, Friston et al. 2019). These approaches are interesting but not decisive for the science 
of consciousness. Even if the metaphysical problem of consciousness were some kind of 
philosopher’s chimera, we would still be confronted with the same formidable and 
perplexing (and intriguing) task of making scientific inroads on our understanding of the 
nature of consciousness. 
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Hence, the project undertaken here is neither pan- or biopsychist, and neither does it 
attempt to solve, or dissolve, the hard problem. It puts familiar properties of consciousness 
first and seeks to explain them in terms of a subclass of self-evidencing mechanisms. 
 
3. Properties of consciousness to explain 
The focus here will be on a set of properties of consciousness worth having, and worth 
explaining. This is partly driven by the considerations above. There is much interesting and 
important science to be done on these properties. It is not so important, for making 
conceptual and scientific progress, that there remain unexplained properties of 
consciousness, or that the metaphysical problem of consciousness remains. 
 
This can be put with a different emphasis. Consider all the disorders and disturbances and 
alterations to consciousness that humans and some animals encounter. Disorders of 
consciousness such as the vegetative state, fugue states in epilepsy, contemplative states in 
wisdom traditions, psychedelic states, schizophrenia, delirium, drunkenness and dementia. 
All these and more interfere with various properties of conscious experience. They are 
important to understand for clinical, therapeutic and leisure reasons. But we can make 
scientific inroads on them by doing consciousness science: taking seriously that they are 
states of consciousness, and not mere cognitive or informational states. It seems irrelevant 
for this work whether the metaphysical problem is solved or not, or dissolved, or whether 
the smallest particles or systems or creatures have proto-conscious properties. 
 
There is some room for pragmatic manoeuvring in selecting the properties of consciousness 
that it will be worth focusing on and explain within the self-evidencing framework. This is 
because what is regarded as explanatory is relative to context, including our prior 
information and interests and values. The approach adopted here is a fairly commonsense 
phenomenology, informed by background knowledge of conditions affecting consciousness, 
filtered through decades of philosophy of mind discussing these matters (see Hohwy 2013: 
Ch 10 for more on this approach). Finessing this set of phenomenological properties is then 
a discursive project. The following list is also fairly briefly indicated, and each aspect of 
consciousness has been treated extensively in substantial philosophical, psychological, and 
phenomenological bodies of literature. 
 
Here is the list of properties of consciousness worth trying to explain: 
 
Conscious perception. What everyone agrees is that conscious perception is a key aspect of 
consciousness. We wake up in the morning, and experience hits us in its full richness. 
Thoughts, feelings, moods, bodily sensations etc. are mixed in with perception of the world 
around us – sights, sounds, smells etc. – flow through our consciousness. Whatever is 
brought to bear on explaining consciousness should make central room for conscious 
perception. Importantly, perception includes not just the external world but also the inner 
world of bodily sensations. 
 
Detached consciousness. Conscious experience is however not confined to perception of 
what is presented to our senses. Experience can be detached from the incoming stimuli. We 
dream during the night, our minds wander and we daydream while awake, we form imagery 
in different sensory modalities (visual, auditory, gustatory etc.), we believe things and think 
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about things that are not in front of us or don’t even exist, like rewards we would like to 
obtain. All of this is part of our conscious phenomenology, so the capacity for detached 
consciousness is crucial for understanding it. The consciousness machinery should be able to 
run off-line. 
 
Conscious unity and first-person perspective. Normally, perhaps always, the stream of 
consciousness has a certain unity. It does not split off in separate streams, and it is difficult 
to see what that would even be like (Bayne 2010). Consciousness seems to, as it were, 
congregate about you, flowing in one direction only. The unified conscious stream always or 
at least mostly has a first-person perspective, where experience is anchored in your 
perspective on the world, your body and your inner life. Perhaps this perspective is 
challenged in some conditions of depersonalisation and delusion (such as Cotard’s delusion) 
but mostly consciousness is first-person (for discussion see, e.g., Metzinger 2004). 
 
Conscious flow. Consciousness is usefully but metaphorically described as somehow a 
stream where conscious experience flows through our minds. One experience more or less 
seamlessly flows into the next. There is a rich and variable temporal structure to this flow, 
with the present occupied by a slightly temporally extended window of experience, 
straddling a bit of the past, the immediate now and into the future. This is sometimes called 
the ‘specious present’ because it is a construction of the mind that is in fact somewhat 
unmoored from the sensory input at this literal point in time. Music, for example, is 
experienced not one note at the time, but in a more temporally extended moving window 
of experience. Much of the vast literature here appeals to William James’ early discussions 
(James 1890, Pockett 2003). 
 
Next comes a set of phenomenological properties of consciousness that are more subtle, 
more hidden behind immediate perceptual appearances, and harder to articulate. 
 
Sense-making and flow states. It makes sense to say that there is no intermediate possibility 
between being conscious versus not being conscious at all. There might be cases where it is 
difficult to ascertain if people or animals are conscious or not, or fully conscious or less than 
fully conscious, but we are not inclined to say that anyone’s state is indeterminately 
conscious ((Bayne, Hohwy et al. 2016); there is discussion about this, as about any topic in 
consciousness science). But within a state of consciousness, there are ways or modes of 
being conscious, such as being attentive, having a mood colouring one’s consciousness, 
being drugged or tired, etc. (Bayne and Hohwy 2016). One interesting distinction in these 
background states is between ‘sense-making’ and ‘flow’ states. Flow states are most well-
known (Csikszentmihalyi 1990), often as something to aspire to, where one is fully 
immersed in what one is doing, with implications for both mood and time perception; flow 
states can be characterised by hyper-attention where not much else than the task-relevant 
experiences seem to enter consciousness. A useful contrast to flow is what may be called 
sense-making states where one is inclined to step back from the current experiential stream 
in order to make sense of it, trying out different interpretations before again establishing 
something closer to the flow state. (Some familiar sense-making states are described in 
cognitive science (Chater and Loewenstein 2016, Gershman 2019, Wojtowicz, Chater et al. 
2021); note that it differs from the technical sense of ‘sense-making’ used in enactivist 
approaches, (e.g., Maturana and Varela 1987, Di Paolo 2005, De Jaegher and Di Paolo 
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2007)). Between entirely befuddled sense-making and fully immersed flow states lies a 
spectrum of states, with a patchwork of sense-making and flow-like states; likely most of 
our conscious waking hours are more in the middle of this spectrum. 
 
Metacognition and introspection. Among the to-and-fro of everyday conscious experiences, 
there seems to be another element, where conscious experience is monitored. This is 
sometimes called metacognition, cognition about cognition. At times it is discussed in terms 
of higher-order thoughts, thoughts about thoughts, which may underlie our intuition that in 
experience we have awareness of mental states (Lau and Rosenthal 2011). It is also 
sometimes likened to forms of introspection. Introspection or metacognition can be an 
explicit task we undertake. For example, when the doctor or nurse asks where on a ten-
point scale your pain is, or if someone, a police officer, asks how confident you are about 
something only you saw. It may be that there is always an element of metacognition 
hovering over our consciousness, even if we do not always engage in explicit introspection. 
It may be that this kind of internal monitoring infuses or gates what we are conscious of and 
how we are conscious of it. 
 
Self. With the subjectivity and first-person perspective of consciousness comes the question 
what that subject or first-person is. What is the self? And how does the self factor into our 
conscious experience? This is again a rich and varied philosophical and psychological debate. 
Entering into more speculative phenomenological ground, it seems that the subjectivity and 
first-person perspective that perfuses conscious experience is not a mere abstract notion or 
geometrical point. The engagement of the self in consciousness comes with a perhaps vague 
conception of who that self is. What kind of person are you, what is your history and set of 
memories, what kind of body do you inhabit that determines your vantage point, what are 
your intentions and desires pointing into the future from here? Put differently, the specious 
present – the moving window of momentary experience – is itself suspended in and 
coloured by the past, present and future of the self.  
 
Sense of being. Lastly, something perhaps a bit more abstruse. Consciousness seems to be 
accompanied by an inchoate sense of being. Jorge Luis Borges, in an early piece otherwise 
sceptical of the existence of a self, perhaps expresses it well, as “this consciousness of being, 
[…] the immediate security of here I am that it breathes into us” (Borges 2000: 4). It is as if 
consciousness silently expresses the sense “I am here, now – I am.” It is the feeling that 
having these experiences now matter deeply to me, not just in terms of what I need and 
think or feel and desire, but in terms of that fact that I am. It is hard to say how widespread 
the sense of being is across the phenomenology of different people. Perhaps it needs to be 
articulated before people become aware of it; perhaps it is so feeble that some would not 
consider it a core property of consciousness. It does tap into a rich tradition in the history of 
philosophy, which I cannot do justice to here. The reason for including it here is that it 
relates to a kind of pure subjectivity that sits close to the otherwise ineffable core of 
consciousness. In an attempt to seed further debate, it is then useful to put it into the 
context of self-evidencing.  
 
That completes the list of phenomenological properties to be considered here. The 
properties seem central to the kind of consciousness that we normally enjoy and which, as 
put above, is worth caring about. It may be that none of them are necessary for 
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consciousness; perhaps alien conscious systems are conceivable that have none of these 
properties, but this would be a very different consciousness than ours – not consciousness 
much worth explaining. Different people may come up with different lists, or may have 
different formulations of more or less the same property. 
 
4. Properties of self-evidencing matched with properties of consciousness  
The list of phenomenological properties of consciousness constitutes the initial explanatory 
target for the predictive processing approach to consciousness. Even if, as argued, self-
evidencing in itself is not sufficient for consciousness, there might be processes of self-
evidencing possessed by some organisms and not others, which are explanatorily relevant 
for consciousness conceived in terms of these properties. 
 
The notion of self-evidencing emerged in philosophy of science, within discussion of 
inference to the best explanation, or abduction (Hempel 1965, Lipton 2004). In an inference 
to the best explanation, some evidence is explained by some hypothesis – that best explains 
the evidence – which is then inferred as true or probable. Often the evidence for the 
hypothesis is just the very evidence it explains. This creates a benign circle where the 
hypothesis explains the evidence and the evidence is evidence for the hypothesis. The 
explanatory power of the hypothesis ensures the hypothesis has evidence for itself – it is 
self-evidencing.   
 
In predictive processing, with the free energy principle, self-evidencing sits with notions of 
self-organisation and self-supervision (Hohwy 2020). There is no outside help or evidence to 
establish the hypothesis (conceived as the system’s internal generative model) – the only 
evidence is the evidence the model can account for. The system needs to configure or 
organise its own internal states (conceived as the model’s parameters and states) in order 
to make the evidence (or sensory input) as expected or unsurprising as possible. As it 
accomplishes this task it accumulates evidence for itself. The task is non-trivial because the 
environment is changing and can undergo unexpected state transitions calling for diverse 
and different surprise-minimising processes. It is then possible for different creatures to go 
about self-evidencing in different ways, and these different ways would be inscribed in their 
model. Some of these ways may then be more explanatorily relevant for consciousness than 
others. (This kind of reasoning about self-evidencing can also be applied to cognition, rather 
than consciousness, where the argument is that some but not all systems are cognitive, in 
virtue of some of their specific self-evidencing processes (Corcoran, Pezzulo et al. 2020); the 
current argument extends this kind of reasoning to the case of consciousness). To the extent 
these ways of self-evidencing carve out a distinction among systems in nature, we also get a 
distinction among systems that are conscious and those that are not; or at least, as 
intimated earlier, systems that are conscious in ways worth caring about and worth 
explaining. 
 
Below, each of the properties of consciousness are matched up with properties of self-
evidencing, in ways that highlight their explanatory potential. Some of these self-evidencing 
properties are explained in more detail in the voluminous literature on the free energy 
principle and in various philosophical and introductory writings (Clark 2016, Buckley, Kim et 
al. 2017, Wiese and Metzinger 2017, Hohwy 2020, Seth forthcoming). 
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Conscious perception. A self-evidencing system may engage in perceptual inference. It may 
adjust the parameters of its hierarchical internal generative model in the light of weighted 
prediction errors, and thereby come to represent the causes of its sensory input. This begins 
to capture the first property, about conscious perception. More specifically, perceptual 
inference of this kind maps on to key phenomena and paradigms in consciousness science, 
such as binocular rivalry. Rivalry can indeed plausibly be explained in terms of this kind of 
predictive processing (Hohwy, Roepstorff et al. 2008, Weilnhammer, Stuke et al. 2017). 
 
More recently, rivalry, and other phenomena relevant for consciousness, such as Troxler 
fading, have been modelled using predictive processing’s key notion of active inference 
(Parr, Corcoran et al. 2019). Active inference relates to action and decision making. The key 
intuition is that a system can act in order to minimise its uncertainty, or do targeted testing 
of its predictions, namely by selective sampling of the sensory input expected under the 
model in question. Active self-evidencing in other words involves a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophesying. In its simplest form, active inference selectively samples input under the 
predictions of its model. For example, if it predicts a source of sounds, like a car, to move 
leftward, it may focus attention leftward, and increase gain on sensory input from that 
region. But there are other ways of engaging in active inference, which not all animals may 
possess. A system may be able to consider not just its current uncertainty, but also its 
expected uncertainty, under various scenarios. That is, the system may be able to consider 
counterfactual scenarios.  
 
In this kind of counterfactual active inference, the system considers what the observations 
would be, were the system to enact one or another policy for action. Now active inference 
becomes a race between possible policies, or an inference to the policy that best augurs 
uncertainty reduction. For this to be a meaningful process, the system’s internal causal 
model of the environment must be brought to bear on the question at hand. This includes 
the system’s model of itself, in order to figure out how a given action performed by that 
system would give rise to certain observations. What makes a policy best is its lack of 
ambiguity, that is, the fidelity of its mapping from actions to outcomes, as well as the 
divergence of the outcomes given the action and the expected (or desired) state. Precise 
policies that tend to get the agent close to its expected (non-surprising) states tend to be 
inferred. When a policy is inferred, it is specified in terms of the observations it would give 
rise to. It is as if the system believes it is already executing the action, even before it actually 
is. That is to say, these still un-actualised observations take on the role of prediction error. 
Since the system is always trying to rid itself of prediction error, it will then selectively 
sample the sensorium, including its own bodily states (proprioception etc.), according to 
these inferred expectations. The system then enacts the inferred policy. 
 
Some organisms may also make what has been labelled ‘sophisticated’ counterfactual 
inferences, where they explicitly represent the very beliefs that they would acquire, were 
they to enact a given policy, and then infer their policies under that counterfactual scenario 
(Friston, Da Costa et al. 2020). Sophisticated inference allows the agent to bring 
counterfactual models to bear on representations of themselves, yielding temporal depth 
and detachment from their current state. This is more genuinely counterfactual than 
standard active inference. It evaluates policies under a contrary-to-current-fact model of 
beliefs, rather than under the current, actual beliefs. 




These more substantial counterfactual and sophisticated notions of active inference relate 
to properties of conscious perception in various ways. To begin, they imply that action is not 
exclusively in service of expected states in the sense of desires or rewarding states. It can 
also be in service of epistemic value, or uncertainty reduction per se. This captures ways of 
exploring one’s environment in order to discover what it is like, even at a cost. Systems then 
need to learn about how to maintain a useful balance between acting for epistemic value 
and acting for utility. One consideration of course is that sometimes acting for utility can be 
premature, if the system has little inkling of how rewards might be distributed in the 
environment, and how complex it would be to get at them. In that case, the system is better 
off going around exploring, and only subsequently trying to target rewards. Acting for 
epistemic value implies that the system has a representation of its own uncertainty. It needs 
to be able to say “my knowledge is likely to have deteriorated, so I am unlikely to infer 
precise policies for utility, so I should be exploring over there in order to bed down my 
model again”. This relates to properties of consciousness because agents imbued with such 
ability to selectively sample the environment in order to reduce uncertainty (that is, in order 
to self-evidence) can be shown to display quite substantial analogies to the perceptual 
dynamics of paradigms of conscious phenomena such as binocular rivalry and Troxler fading 
(Parr, Corcoran et al. 2019). There is thus some reason to think that conscious perception 
can be matched up with, and perhaps explained in some respects, by particular ways of self-
evidencing that only some types of organisms possess. 
 
Detached consciousness. Now consider detachment, the next of the selected properties of 
consciousness. Self-evidencing is rife with forms of detachment. At its most basic, self-
evidencing systems are described and defined in terms of their enduring Markov blankets 
(Hohwy 2016, Kirchhoff, Parr et al. 2018, Palacios, Razi et al. 2020). Markov blankets are 
statistical descriptions of causal nets, in terms of Markov properties of conditional 
independence. They describe the boundary of organisms, identifying the external causes of 
sensory input to the blanket’s sensory states, and the external effects of the changes driven 
by the blanket’s active states. In between the sensory and active states are the internal, 
blanketed states. Markov blankets create a natural locus of detachment because, even 
though the internal states are causally connected to the external states, the conditional 
independence of the blanket means the behaviour of the internal states can be explained 
just in terms of the states of the blanket, independently of the external states. In other 
words, it is conceivable that there may be some detached interesting behaviour of the 
system for the understanding of which no appeal to the external states is needed. This is a 
promising start for addressing detachment. 
 
Every self-organising system, even non-conscious ones, will have Markov blankets. So the 
detachment that comes just from possessing a blanket is not going to be directly 
informative about consciousness. But different types of systems can organise their internal 
states according to different processes, some of which speak more directly to conscious 
detachment. Consider that in addition to just revising models in light of prediction error and 
inferring policies, systems are well-served to engage in model selection. Systems that have a 
relatively long time-horizon over which they consider their expected uncertainty should 
select models that help them keep uncertainty in check. One process would be to select 
more simple models over more complex ones, as simple models (as long as they are not 
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overly simple) will accumulate less prediction error as time passes, since they are less likely 
to be fitted to noise. An interesting proposal is that some systems, such as humans and 
some other animals, dream as a result of engaging in model simplification, where 
unnecessary model parameters are pruned (Hobson and Friston 2012). This connects a 
canonical example of detached consciousness, dreaming to a type of self-evidencing that 
may not be seen in all self-evidencing systems (for further discussion of predictive 
processing and dreaming, Windt 2018). 
 
Detachment can be found in other self-evidencing processes too. In prospective, 
counterfactual active inference of the kind explained above, there is a clear element of 
detachment, which speaks more directly to occurrent conscious perception (as compared to 
dreaming). Under active inference, the current sensory input is set aside and virtual, 
counterfactual observations take their place. This happens as the inferred policies are 
weighed against each other, and as the winning policy is enacted. The system assumes non-
actual sensory input is actual, that is, it detaches from the actual input in favour of internally 
generated observations. It may well be that conscious perception then only occurs as those 
enacted policies are unfolding and the prediction errors are actually quashed through 
selective sampling. But even so there is an element of detachment that sits well with 
conscious perception. The striking fact about binocular rivalry and Troxler fading is that a 
large part of the sensory input is not allowed entry into consciousness (i.e., the suppressed 
eye’s image or the peripheral stimuli). This is a kind of detachment from sensory input, 
which is explained well by the appeal to selective sampling in active inference accounts of 
these types of perceptual phenomena. To the extent consciousness is characterised by 
detachment, self-evidencing processes in some types of systems (and not others) may thus 
indeed be a good fit. 
 
Conscious unity and first-person perspective. Next comes the unity and first-person 
perspective in the flow of the conscious stream. Self-evidencing does not make much sense 
in a wholly inactive system that is just more or less porously receiving input from the world. 
Such a system would just have some sensors and some internal states; it may engage in 
predictive coding, and a Markov blanket may be able to be drawn around it for some short 
period of time. But there would be little reason to suppose it can have a unified stream of 
experiences and a first-person perspective. Its internal processing could easily be disjointed, 
fragmented and distributed. Since we do not know the ultimate basis of consciousness it is 
not inconceivable that such a system is conscious, but it would be a consciousness much 
different to ours, without unity and a first-person perspective. If the system is allowed to 
act, and engage in active inference, then there is a better case to make for unity and a first-
person perspective. For basic active inference, selective sampling according to predictions of 
sensory input would already yield a kind of singular perspective and focused stream. From a 
causal model perspective, the system is now a more distinct, unitary cause among other 
worldly causes, as it moves through the world and contributes to causal interactions. The 
sequence of sensory samples it selects are from different vantage points on the same world, 
and would provide a more or less continuous, more or less coherent, stream of states. This 
is a starting-point for unity and first-person perspective. However, it seems too rudimentary 
to capture what we have in mind for these as properties of consciousness (for discussion, 
see Hohwy 2013: Ch 10). 
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Systems that have counterfactual active inference seem better placed to have a unified 
stream and first-person perspective as we know it from our own consciousness (for a self-
evidencing account along these lines, see Friston 2018). Now, in advance of acting (or as the 
system is enacting its current inferred policies) it is already looking ahead counterfactually 
at its next action. It marshals the relevant policies, those it has learnt in past experience are 
precise and unambiguous for the context at hand, and counterfactually plays them out to 
gauge the expected observations under them. This counterfactual exercise must represent 
the agent themselves, as a singular cause interacting with the world, to elicit the 
observations that would occur to itself as a policy unfolds. This first-person perspective 
would be more pronounced in sophisticated active inference, where the agent’s own 
counterfactual beliefs are explicitly represented in iterated inference of policies. This seems 
to build in a more substantial first-person perspective onto mere agency, which anchors the 
observations under the inferred policy and creates a stream as the policy’s control states 
(the individual movements making up the policy) are strung together to minimise the 
prediction error arising from inferring the policy.  
 
Unity of the conscious stream also can also be accommodated because it is difficult to see 
how the fulfilment of the expected stream of observations would split into two or more, 
given the existence of one Markov blanketed system. If there were two streams, it would 
seem more natural to consider this two consciousnesses, enabled by two independent 
Markov blankets, rather than two streams in the same one consciousness. That is, from a 
causal perspective, the existence of two streams would look more like cell division or birth 
than a splitting of consciousness. This would perhaps still allow for fluid or intermediate 
cases, such as potentially some conjoined twins who may in some instances infer joint 
policies, and on other instances infer distinct policies. Hence, these properties of 
consciousness can feasibly be found in those creatures capable of engaging in active 
inference on the basis of their expected uncertainty (or free energy). 
 
Conscious flow. The idea that within the stream of consciousness experiences somehow 
seamlessly flow one after another can also be captured (this sense of ‘flow’ differs from 
Csikszentmihalyi’s notion of flow states, to be discussed later). It is tempting to think that 
the flow of conscious experience is driven by the flow of sensory input. As the world 
changes in front of one’s eyes, so will the flow of consciousness. There is of course truth to 
this but change in sensory input is neither necessary or sufficient for change in flow. In 
inattentional blindness, quite saliently changing yet centrally fixated visual input is 
suppressed from consciousness. Dreaming is case where the Markov blanketed internal 
states of the brain somehow organise themselves to produce a flow of consciousness in the 
absence of input. Internally generated flow also occurs in binocular rivalry, where the 
different input to the two eyes (e.g., a face and a house) is kept constant and yet there is an 
alternating flow of conscious experience between the two images. This is of course an 
instance of the kind of detachment discussed earlier, but the question here is what explains 
the flow? In the studies analysing rivalry through predictive coding and active inference 
mentioned earlier (Hohwy, Roepstorff et al. 2008, Parr, Corcoran et al. 2019), the key trigger 
for alternation is the relaxation of priors. As the system settles into one inference 
(perceiving a face), the prior behind it will begin to decrease. The prior decreases due to a 
volatility belief to the effect that the probability of state transitions is increasing. In other 
words, it is unlikely that the world stays unchanged for very long, so the old prior will soon 
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be obsolete. A decreasing prior means that uncertainty is rising. Under active inference, 
uncertainty is accompanied by inference of a policy that is expected to reduce that 
uncertainty. In rivalry, this active inference is endogenous attention, increasing sensory gain 
for the input from the stimulus shown to the competing eye, which then comes to populate 
perception until its prior in turn decreases. In this way, the flow of conscious experience is 
driven, not by the world, but by how self-evidencing engages with our beliefs about the 
state transitions of the world; conscious flow is therefore surprisingly detached from the 
current sensory input (Hohwy, Paton et al. 2016). 
 
Conscious flow can be conceived as a moving window (of typically approx. 200ms width; 
Pockett 2003), rather than as an extensionless point. This ‘specious present’ suggests that 
there is computation going on at the shortest time scales of the conscious stream, as 
snippets of already past input and soon-to-arrive input are included in the construction of 
conscious experience. However, it perhaps seems implausible that this computation is the 
laborious generation of sophisticated counterfactual outcomes for selective sampling. What 
is experienced in the specious present does not immediately seem counterfactual, rather it 
mostly seems relatively phenomenologically robust, even if laden with action possibilities. 
One potential way to accommodate this tension between robust presence and 
counterfactuality is through a combination of short time-scale amortized active inference 
that feeds into ongoing longer time-scale and truly counterfactual inference. In amortized 
active inference, policy-observation mappings from past inferences are re-used on new 
occasions, obviating the need to figure out parameters anew (Gershman and Goodman 
2014, Millidge 2019, Friston, Da Costa et al. 2020). These efficient, rapid and ready-made 
inferences can then serve as the basis for more languid sophisticated active inference, as 
described above. This is an efficient strategy but only at short time-scales where the risk of 
underlying state transitions is low. Sophisticated inference could then describe an intriguing, 
layered phenomenology, encompassing a robust specious present imbued with a wider 
action-relevant, first-person perspective. Again, it may be that some systems, such as 
humans, have particular repertoires of amortized inferences, and particular capacities for 
iterating them in more flexible sophisticated active inference in cortical hierarchies of some 
depth. Other systems, who occupy highly stable niches, may more safely relegate much 
more processing to amortized inference. 
 
Sense-making and flow states. The self-evidencing account of what drives conscious flow 
highlights the role of higher-order beliefs, such as beliefs about volatility, which governs 
certainty about our current perceptual or active inference. Behind the first-order 
representation thus lie continued, internal modelling of the ongoing state transitions, giving 
rise to beliefs about overall uncertainty, expressing the quality of one’s ongoing self-
evidencing. This can be used to throw light on background states of consciousness, such as 
the distinction, listed earlier, between attentionally focused and immersive flow states, and 
more searching, broad sense-making states. 
 
The idea here is that immersion is facilitated by highly precise prediction error and 
unambiguous policies, made possible in part by low probability of volatile state transitions. 
The world has to not change behind one’s back for flow states to occur. Conversely, we shift 
into sense-making mode, with a broader, more exploratory attentional profile, when we 
begin to believe that there are hidden causal interactions leading to state transitions, which 
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imminently will change our current grasp of the world, and prevent flow. Our sense of 
uncertainty about our self-evidencing may become so severe that we give up on the current 
model of the given situation – it may simply be accumulating too much uncertainty to be 
worth revising or guide selective sampling. This will then trigger (Bayesian) model selection, 
where we seek to more fundamentally make new sense of the situation. The system steps 
back and appeals to contextual cues and to the complexity and simplicity of the available 
models, before settling on one, and then commencing perceptual and active inference 
under it. Model selection is also part of self-evidencing, as one of the many ways the 
Markov blanketed system organises itself in preparation of active engagement with the 
world that can help it maximise evidence for itself. The modelling of the higher-order 
statistics of the world one represents thus drives processes that can help us understand 
some background states of consciousness.  
 
These background states may be distinctively expressed in systems with particular 
repertoires of amortized inferences and capacities for iterated active inference. The low 
probability of volatile state transitions characteristic of flow states may afford an extended 
repertoire of amortized inferences, curbing the need for more open-ended counterfactual 
and self-involving processing. As state transitions being to emerge, the range of safe 
amortization shrinks and counterfactual, self-involving processing increasingly colours 
conscious experience, at least for systems with some hierarchical depth. Systems relying 
more on amortization will not experience the same character of background states. 
 
Metacognition and introspection. There is much recent theoretical and empirical work on 
metacognition – cognition about cognition – which is being tied to consciousness in 
intriguing ways (Fleming 2021). Self-evidencing provides a convenient backdrop for 
metacognition. As described just above, in a changing, volatile world, some of the system’s 
internal modelling must be given over to second-order statistical modelling of state 
transitions and uncertainty. This level of modelling is blind to the actual causes of sensory 
input and only feeds on the context-dependent fluctuations of uncertainty in the system. It 
has a direct impact on the processing of the first-order statistical, internal states it seeks to 
model, through controlling the gain on the prediction errors it “looks down at” (this aspect 
of self-evidencing is sometimes described in terms of precision optimisation and captures 
attentional mechanisms). This necessary aspect of self-evidencing provides the constant 
hum of internal monitoring, which could underwrite the property of consciousness 
considered here, about metacognitive, introspection-like, states of being ‘conscious-of’ 
one’s own mental representations (Hohwy 2015). It may be that some systems, such as 
humans and some other animals, have developed ways to engage in this kind of 
metacognitive second-order statistics that bring metacognition closer to consciousness, 
such as the ability to actively and voluntarily select policies that dial up or dial down neural 
gain, irrespective of what the current uncertainty landscape is actually like (i.e., forcing 
attentional focus). Or, only some systems may be able to form explicit beliefs about their 
internal monitoring, and report them to doctors and police officers interested in 
judgements of confidence rather than reports of external states of affairs. More 
speculatively still, it may be that some systems can perform sophisticated inference upon 
their own metacognition, explicitly representing what their introspective beliefs would be 
under iterated counterfactual scenarios.  
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Self. Next there is the self and the question how it factors into our conscious experience. 
There are now several studies that seek to explain the self from the predictive processing 
perspective (Limanowski and Blankenburg 2013, Apps and Tsakiris 2014, Hohwy and 
Michael 2017, Perrykkad and Hohwy 2020). They tend to share the idea that the self is a 
model of inferred causes of sensory input. The idea here is that the agent themselves, their 
body and internal states are part of the causes of the sensory input the agent receives. The 
way we act in the world is influenced by what kind of self we are, and those actions bend 
back on the agent, determining what sensory input they receive. This input is prediction 
error, which is modelled in a self-evidencing, self-modelling process. Essentially, by 
modelling ourselves we will surprise ourselves less in the long-term average. This means 
that you do not know your self somehow directly, rather the self is inferred as a 
constellation of hidden causes that drives patterns in our behaviour. This also means the 
self is real, or as real as other causes of sensory input (Hohwy and Michael 2017). This kind 
of literal self-evidencing appears to be an attractive account of the nature of the self. It 
might also help explain the way self-awareness infuses our daily conscious experience. For 
systems capable of active inference on the basis of their expected uncertainty, running 
counterfactuals that map out actions-to-observations would continuously recruit and 
finesse the self-model. This is because extracting the sensory observations that would 
happen when executing a policy depends on the trajectory of one’s body through space and 
time, and the internal causes (such as character traits) motivating the body’s trajectory is 
informative for figuring this out. If, as argued earlier, active inference is central for conscious 
perception, and its flow in experience, then there would be traces of the self in all conscious 
perception. The self-trace in consciousness will be amplified in sophisticated active 
inference (as explained above), where the agent’s own beliefs, under a counterfactual 
policy, are explicitly inferred. For systems with considerable hierarchical depth in their 
model, these explicitly represented beliefs about themselves could capture the types of 
relatively stable character traits we typically associate with our self.  
 
Sense of being. Last on the list there was the sense of being. This aspect of phenomenology 
would be more fundamental and austere than the perfusion of experience with 
interoceptive beliefs, self-relating counterfactuals, or a structured, explicit self-model. It is 
not a representation of the causes of sensory input, neither in the world or in the system 
itself, so it is not directly related to the types of interoceptive inference thought to leverage 
sense of agency and affect as markers of homeostatic processes (Seth, Suzuki et al. 2012, 
Barrett 2016, Hesp, Smith et al. 2021). It would rather be an awareness of existence, tied to 
the very having of conscious experience. Being conscious helps us fathom our existence. To 
see a way of capturing this, consider that self-evidencing expresses the belief that “I exist”, 
where the precision about this belief would rely on the rate of self-evidencing. If self-
evidencing goes poorly, then the evidence for existence suffers – the belief is imprecise and 
flattens out. It may be that some systems, such as humans, can explicitly represent this 
precision of self-evidencing beliefs. To speculate further, sophisticated active inference at 
the highest level of abstraction could be associated with representation of expected “I exist” 
beliefs, resulting from iteration of counterfactual processing for precise policies. Though this 
belief is devoid of actual content apart from the rate of uncertainty reduction, it could give 
rise to a more or less confident sense of being. Obviously, these speculations provide only 
some first steps in using self-evidencing to account for this most subtle, but also, it seems, 
important aspect of conscious experience. 




5. Concluding remarks 
This completes the matching-up of types of self-evidencing with properties of 
consciousness. The selected list of properties can of course be debated, and the list of self-
evidencing properties is also incomplete and is being expanded and finessed as the 
framework evolves. But it is a start on a project that can explain a constellation of salient 
properties of consciousness, and tie them together in a description of systems such as 
humans and some other animals, which self-evidence in distinct ways, which are unlikely to 
occur in every self-organising and self-evidencing system. Part of the motivation for this 
particular list of consciousness properties is that it picks out properties of a type of 
consciousness that we care about and that is worth having. It contrasts to types of possible 
consciousness that are very far removed from the human experience (e.g., as postulated in 
panpsychist or biopsychist positions). It is plausible that a case can be made that other 
properties should be added to the list of a consciousness worth having, for example about 
mood and emotions, or contemplative states of compassion and connectedness. This is 
welcome, for it will be an interesting research project to view such properties from the 
perspective of self-evidencing. 
 
From a metaphysical perspective, instantiation of these self-evidencing processes in a 
system does not entail that the system is conscious. It is after all logically conceivable that 
there is a creature that self-evidences in just these ways, which is nevertheless devoid of 
consciousness, even if its internal representations have some of these properties. In other 
words, this is not a solution to the hard metaphysical mind-body problem. 
 
Even if this account does not address the hard problem, it can be naturalistically and 
phenomenologically informative. It may be that we can better grasp the neurobiological 
grounding of consciousness by conceiving these salient phenomenological properties in 
terms of self-evidencing mechanisms (Hohwy and Seth 2020), and it may be that we gain a 
better handle on how to define and articulate properties of consciousness if we see them as 
manifestations of particular kinds of self-evidencing. The resulting position can be described 
as follows: the key explanandum is phenomenology, and a set of self-evidencing properties 
transpire as good explanations of why those properties are the way they are, including how 
they might not occur in creatures we do not consider conscious; hence it is an attempt at 
inferring self-evidencing as the best explanation of phenomenology. More work is obviously 
needed to establish that self-evidencing furnishes the best explanation. But it has promising 
beginnings of several classic “best-makers”: self-evidencing properties are unified with each 
other under the free energy principle, active inference in particular can explain in detail 
perceptual, cognitive and behavioural phenomena (Parr, Pezzulo et al. In print), and active 
inference integrates well with existing science on neurophysiology and anatomy, yielding 
promising process theories (Friston, FitzGerald et al. 2017). 
 
The core claim is that distinct subset of types of self-evidencing explain phenomenological 
properties. The explanatory relevance has centred on computational self-evidencing 
mechanisms for generating the properties of content, confidence, context-dependence, 
nested and iterated dynamics of inference, and intrinsic hierarchical processes that can be 
discerned in phenomenology. There are significant questions in the philosophy of science 
about such naturalistic, bottom-up or reductive explanation. In philosophy of neuroscience, 
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there is useful debate about mechanistic explanation, mainly focused on cognitive 
mechanisms (Bechtel 2007, Craver 2007) with developments in particular around 
computational approaches and consciousness (Piccinini 2020). In phenomenological and 
physiological traditions, there is debate about how to frontload phenomenology into the 
explanatory project and what it would mean for there to be explanatorily substantial 
isomorphism between physiology and phenomenology (for discussion, drawing lines back to 
Kurt Koffka and Edwin Boring, see Feest 2021). An ongoing project here is to more closely 
marry the mechanistic and computational debates with the phenomenological debates, and 
thereby lay the ground for scientific projects that forge the explanatorily link for measurable 
properties of phenomenology (Ramstead, Hesp et al. 2021); a concrete example here could 
be the mentioned active inference account on Troxler fading and binocular rivalry (Parr, 
Corcoran et al. 2019). 
 
The resulting picture of consciousness appears quite attractive. It ties consciousness closely 
to our basic sense of existence, our striving to make sense of the world and ourselves and all 
the hidden causes creating fluctuating uncertainty in our sensory input. It relies directly on 
our looping flows of perception and action, and the way they play out in us as we engage 
attentively with the world; and it portrays consciousness in contrast to other kinds of 
creatures who do not enjoy our kind of consciousness. 
 
The picture of consciousness is also somewhat surprising, or even disturbing. It helps us 
explain the many different ways conscious experience detaches from current sensory input, 
which is an important aspect of the explanatory project. But it seems to make a virtue out of 
detachment. The theme is that detachment is driven by internal volatility beliefs, such that 
the content and flow of experience is determined by how the system believes it can best 
deal with changing rates of self-evidencing. This is less connected to the inflowing sensory 
input from causes in the world than we would perhaps normally think. Even in everyday 
perception of the things around us, there is mediation through active inference’s penchant 
for relying on prediction error generated in a process of decidedly detached counterfactual 
processes. The detachment is not however wholly and disturbingly Cartesian or Kantian, 
because when the expected observations given a policy are then selectively sampled, the 
system needs the world to play its part. If the world does not afford to the system the 
expected uncertainty reduction, then self-evidencing suffers, and this would be reflected in 
conscious experience (for discussion of these topics, see Clark 2017, Hohwy 2017). Overall, 
it seems we can speak meaningfully of conscious self-evidencing, with a picture of our 
consciousness that is created and unfolds according to the system’s own, internal self-
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